Abstract-Anonymous receiver encryption is an important cryptographic primitive. It can protect the privacy of the receiver. In 2010, Fan et al proposed an anonymous multi-receiver IDbased encryption by using Lagrange interpolating polynomial. However, Wang et al showed that Fan et al's scheme didn't satisfy the anonymity of the receivers. Then they provided an improved scheme to fix it and showed that the improved scheme was secure. Unfortunately, in this paper, we pointed out that Wang et al's improved scheme did not satisfy the receiver's anonymity by analyzing the security of the scheme yet. After analyzing the reason to produce such flaws, we gave an improved method to repair it and showed that our improved scheme could satisfy the receiver's anonymity. And the improved scheme has the advantage over Wang et al's scheme in terms of computational cost.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the development of information techniques, Grouporiented communication is more and more important in real life, such as network conference and broadcast communication. In cloud computing environment, in order to prevent important data corruption, a client may transmit these data to a set of authorized clouds for backup. And the client may only hope that those authorized clouds are allowed to access the data. To realize such functions, we can adopt broadcast encryption scheme such as those in [3] , [4] or a multi-receiver encryption scheme such as those in [6] , [?] , [7] to achieve it. However, for privacy-preserving, a receiver does not want to its identity to be known by the other authorized receivers in many scenarios in that it may concern the sensitive information of the receiver. For example, in the ordering sensitive Pay-TV programmes, a receiver or customer doesn't usually hope that the other customers know her/his identity information and TV-program types. Thus,it is very necessary to have identity information of the receiver anonymous to protect personal privacy interest.
In 2010, Fan et al proposed a secure and efficient anonymous multi-receiver IBE scheme [2] by combining Lagrange interpolating polynomial theorem and ID-based encryption. And they claimed that their scheme could protect the receiver's anonymity. Recently, Wang et al showed that Fan et al's scheme was insecure and can not achieve the receiver's anonymity in [1] . Then they proposed an improved scheme to fix this weakness. Unfortunately, by analyzing Wang et al's scheme, we found that Wang et al's improved scheme was also insecure and not able to achieve the receiver's anonymity yet. Namely, an authorized receiver can easily verify whether a specific receiver belongs to the authorized receiver. After analyzing the reason to produce such attack, an improved method is proposed to repair it.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will fist review some fundamental backgrounds related to the paper.
Let 1 be a cyclic additive group generated by with the order prime , and 2 be a cyclic multiplicative group with the same order . Let : 1 × 1 −→ 2 be a pairing which satisfies the following conditions [10] :
• Bilinearity: For any , , ∈ 1 , we have ( + , ) = ( , ) ( , ) and ( , + ) = ( , ) ( , ). In particular, for any , ∈ ,
• Non-degeneracy: There exists ,
There is an efficient algorithm to compute ( , ) for , ∈ 1 . The typical way of obtaining such pairing is by deriving them from the Weil pairing or the Tate pairing on an elliptic curve over a finite field. Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem: Given , , ∈ 1 for randomly chosen , ∈ to . The success probability of any probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm in solving CDH problem in 1 is defined to be
The CDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm , is negligible. Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem: Given , , , ∈ 1 for randomly chosen , , ∈ to ( , ) . The success probability of any probabilistic polynomialtime algorithm in solving BDH problem in 1 is defined to be
The BDH assumption states that for every probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm , is negligible. Co-decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Problem[?]: Given ( , , , , ) for randomly chosen , ∈ , ∈ 1 , ∈ 2 , it goal is to determine whether ( , ) = .
III. REVIEWS OF WANG et al'S ANONYMOUS MULTI-RECEIVER ID-BASED ENCRYPTION SCHEME
In the following, we review Wang et al's anonymous mutltireceiver ID-based encryption scheme [1] . The scheme consists of four algorithms. Please the interested readers refer to [1] for detail. In the following, we only review this scheme.
A. Setup
Let 1 be an additive cyclic group and 2 be a multiplicative cyclic group, the order of their two groups is the same prime order . Let be a randomly chosen generator of 1 and : 1 × 1 → 2 be a bilinear mapping.
PKG randomly chooses an integer ∈ and an random element 1 ∈ 1 . Then it sets = . Choose five cryptographic one-way hash functions
where is a security factor. The symmetric encryption and decryption functions with a secret key are represented by and , respectively.
be published and the master private key is secretly kept.
B. Key Extract

Input system
and an identity ∈ {0, 1} * , the PKG computes as follows: 1) compute = 1 ( ); 2) then set = ( 1 + ) as the private key of the user .
C. Encrypting Algorithm
Take into input system , a encrypted message and the selected receiver's identities set { 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , }, the algorithm is executed as follows: 1) Pick a random string ∈ {0, 1} to compute =
where coefficient ∈ .
D. Decrypt phase:
, a receiver with identity can make use of his private key to do the following steps:
) and test whether = ′ or not. If it holds, then the decrypted plaintext is message .
IV. ANONYMITY ATTACK ON WANG ET AL'S SCHEME
In [1] , Wang et al gave an improved anonymous multireceiver encryption scheme by repairing Fan et al's scheme [2] . And they claimed that their anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme has overcome the drawbacks of which Fan et al.'s scheme was not anonymous to any other receiver. Unfortunately, we will show that their improved scheme cannot provide anonymity of the receivers yet. This is to say, a receiver in the designated set can know the identities of the other receivers. In the following, we give the detail attack.
1) Given a ciphertext
2) Let denote an index of the designated receiver set. 3) Upon receiving the ciphertext , the receiver with the identity sets two functions
Then it computes , .
where = ( ) and = 1 ( ) 4) According to the above computation, we can obtain
Note: for a ciphertext , , , are fixed.
5) For the receiver with identity
, it can obtain = 3 ( , ) from decryption process. 6) To reveal the identities of the other receivers, the receiver with identity compute as follows by the formation the above and : For = 1 to n and
is the identity of the designated receiver set. According to the above step 6, we know that any receiver can determine whether the other is one of the designated multireceivers. It means that Wang et al.'s improved anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme cannot satisfy the anonymity yet.
The reason to such attack is that given a ciphertext , = 3 ( , ) can be recovered by plaintext and the symmetrical key which encrypts the plaintext. To overcome such attack, we only makes that any designated receiver cannot recover .
V. AN IMPROVED SCHEME The main idea in the improved scheme is to make that cannot be recovered in the decryption phase. The notations in the improved scheme are the same to these of Wang et al.'s scheme. We focus on the improvement of encryption algorithm and decryption algorithm. The other algorithms are the same to these of Wang et al's scheme except a hash function 5 : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} , < in Setup phase.
A. Encrypting Algorithm
Input system , a encrypted message and the designated receiver's identities set { 1 , ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , }, the algorithm is executed as follows: 1) Pick a random number ∈ * to compute = . 2) Then, for = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , randomly choose ∈ to compute = −1 mod . 3) And for = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , compute = ( ) and
where coefficient ∈ . 5) For = 1, 2, ⋅ ⋅ ⋅ , , it computes
B. Decrypt phase:
Given a ciphertext
, a receiver with identity can make use of his private key to do the following steps: 1) Compute = ( ). 2) Then compute
If it holds, then the decrypted plaintext is message . In the following, we show that the improved scheme is correct. This is to say, if a receiver belongs to the designated receiver set, then it must decrypt the ciphertext to the corresponding message.
Since for any receiver with the identity , 1 ≤ ≤ , it can compute = ( ) and input it into the function ( ).
Thus, we can obtain
step3 : = 4 ( ) ( ) = It means that our improved scheme satisfies correctness.
In our improved scheme, random number cannot be recovered by the designated receiver. And appears in the formation. Given , , , anyone cannot obtain ( , ) , because the hardness of solving ( , ) is equivalent to solve the bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem.
For the confidentiality of improved scheme, we don't discuss here. The security proof is similar to one in Wang et al.'s scheme. Please the interested reader refer to [1] for the detail. Theorem 1. The improved scheme satisfies the receiver anonymity if the BDH problem is hard.
Proof. To prove the receiver anonymity, we divide the adversaries into two classes. The one is the non-authorized receiver, the other is the authorized receiver. For the authorized receiver's attack, it is the more powerful than the nonauthorized receiver's attack. If the non-authorized receiver's attack is successful, then the authorized receiver's attack is also successful. Thus, we only consider the authorized receiver's attack.
, without loss of generality, we assume that the authorized receiver with identity is the adversary, the attacked specific receiver's identity is . Then it can obtain , , ( , ) and ( , 1 ) for the adversary. According the above decrypting algorithm, to distinguish the specific receiver with identity , it must determine whether = ( , )
, , ), it is equivalent to the hardness of solving the Co-decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman problem to distinguish ( , ) = ( , ). Thus, the improved scheme achieves the anonymity protection of the receivers.
In the following, we briefly analyze the efficiency of our scheme. In terms of communication overhead, to achieve a standard security level of 2 80 , we let be a 512-bit long prime number. and Thus, in Wang et al's scheme, the length of each ciphertext is 1024 + + | | bits. and the length of each ciphertext in our improved scheme is also 1024 + + | | bits, where | | denotes the length of symmetrical encryption algorithm . In terms of the computational cost, the computation to produce a ciphertext in Wang et al's scheme is (3 + 1) + 1 , however, the computation to produce a ciphertext in the improved scheme is (2 1 ) + 1 , where denotes the scale multiplication of point in group 1 , is a pairing operation and is the member number of the receivers set. According to the above analysis, the improved scheme has the advantage over Wang et al's scheme in terms of computational cost.
VI. CONCLUSION
Anonymous multi-receiver encryption is a way to protect the privacy of the receivers. Recently, Wang et al gave an improved anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme to achieve privacy-preserving of the receivers. However, we show that Wang et al.'s improved anonymous multi-receiver encryption scheme is insecure in this paper. It fails to achieve the receiver's anonymity. An authorized receiver can easily verify whether a specific user belongs to the authorized receivers. Then we give the corresponding attack and analyze the reason to produce such attack. To overcome this weakness, we have proposed an improved scheme which can repair the receiver anonymity protection . 
